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MAYA

Maywood Acquisition Corp.

MAYA

Maywood Acquisition Corp. NASDAQ
$10.32 0.10% (+0.01)

Market Cap $112.69 M
52w High $10.40
52w Low $9.86
Dividend Yield 0%
P/E 0
Volume 10.07K
Outstanding Shares 10.92M

Income Statement

Period Revenue Operating Expense Net Income Net Profit Margin Earnings Per Share EBITDA
Q3-2025 $0 $0 $70.891K 0% $0.01 $0
Q2-2025 $0 $46.942K $861.511K 0% $0.07 $-46.942K
Q1-2025 $0 $40.423K $379.937K 0% $0.05 $-40.423K
Q4-2024 $0 $5.534 $-5.534 0% $0 $-25
Q3-2024 $0 $365 $-365 0% $0 $-365

Balance Statement

Period Cash & Short-term Total Assets Total Liabilities Total Equity
Q3-2025 $289.58K $88.836M $4.611M $-4.261M
Q2-2025 $496.072K $88.128M $3.974M $84.154M
Q1-2025 $504.566K $87.258M $3.969M $83.288M
Q4-2024 $0 $131.602 $114.314 $17.288

Cash Flow Statement

Period Net Income Cash From Operations Cash From Investing Cash From Financing Net Change Free Cash Flow
Q3-2025 $70.891K $-206.493K $0 $0 $-206.492K $-206.493K
Q2-2025 $861.511K $-12.65K $0 $4.156K $-8.494K $-12.65K
Q1-2025 $379.937K $-218.301K $-86.25M $86.973M $504.566K $-218.301K
Q4-2024 $-5.534 $-114 $0 $114.304 $0 $-114

Five-Year Company Overview

Income Statement

Income Statement Maywood today is essentially a financing shell, not an operating business, and that shows clearly in the income statement data provided: there is no revenue, no operating profit, and no earnings. That’s normal for a SPAC, whose purpose is to raise cash and then merge with a private company. Any future income statement story will really be about GOWell’s results once the merger closes, not about Maywood’s historical performance. Until you see combined financials, it’s hard to judge profitability, margins, or earnings power in a meaningful way.


Balance Sheet

Balance Sheet The balance sheet data in the snapshot is effectively empty, which reflects Maywood’s role as a blank-check company rather than a traditional operating firm with plants, inventory, or large receivables. In practice, SPACs mainly hold cash and a small set of liabilities tied to the IPO structure, and their true post-deal balance sheet will depend on how much cash is left after shareholder redemptions, deal costs, and any additional financing. The important balance-sheet questions going forward will be: how much net cash GOWell has after the merger, how leveraged the combined company becomes, and how resilient its assets are against cycles in energy spending.


Cash Flow

Cash Flow Reported cash flow figures in the data are also essentially zero, which again is typical for a SPAC that doesn’t run a real business yet. Historically, Maywood’s cash flows would have come mostly from financing activities (its IPO and trust structure), not from selling products or services. After the merger, the focus shifts entirely to GOWell’s ability to turn its technology and contracts into steady operating cash, to fund ongoing R&D, and to weather downturns in drilling and well services without constant trips back to the capital markets.


Competitive Edge

Competitive Edge On a stand‑alone basis Maywood has no operating edge; its competitive position is entirely tied to GOWell, the merger target. GOWell appears to occupy a specialized niche in well logging and integrity solutions, with advanced tools and long-standing relationships with major oilfield service providers. Its strength lies in high‑value, technically demanding work rather than in commodity services. At the same time, it operates in a highly competitive and cyclical industry, where customer budgets are influenced by energy prices, regulations, and the pace of the energy transition. Its independence from the very largest integrated service giants can be both a strength (flexibility, focus) and a vulnerability (less scale, less pricing power).


Innovation and R&D

Innovation and R&D The clearest positive theme is GOWell’s innovation and R&D culture. It has a dedicated research team, a base in a major energy hub, and a suite of differentiated tools for pipe inspection, flow diagnostics, and well integrity, including award‑winning technologies. Many of these offerings are protected by patents and appear tailored to difficult, high‑temperature or complex multi‑pipe environments where accuracy is critical. GOWell is also leaning into the energy transition by adapting its tools for geothermal, carbon storage, and gas storage applications. The key question is how effectively and consistently it can translate this innovation into commercial contracts and recurring service work, and whether it can keep its technology edge as competitors respond.


Summary

MAYA today is best viewed as a vehicle in transition rather than a conventional financial services company. Its historical financials offer little insight because it has been a shell with no real revenue, profits, or operating cash flow. The substance of the story is the proposed combination with GOWell, which would turn the entity into a technology‑driven energy services company. If the merger proceeds as described, the main things to track will be: the final deal terms and post‑merger capital structure; the health of GOWell’s own revenues, margins, and cash generation through cycles; the durability of its technical lead in well integrity and logging; and how well it captures growth from geothermal, carbon storage, and other energy transition niches. Until detailed, combined financial statements are available, any assessment of long‑term value or risk around MAYA remains highly dependent on expectations about GOWell’s operational execution and the broader energy market backdrop, rather than on Maywood’s historical numbers.