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MHLA

Maiden Holdings, Ltd. 6.625 NT 2046

MHLA

Maiden Holdings, Ltd. 6.625 NT 2046 • NYSE
$14.69 ▲ 2.03% (+0.29)
Market Cap $1.27 B
52w High $17.05
52w Low $12.25
Dividend Yield 1.66%
P/E -6.05
Volume 2.48K
Outstanding Shares 86.62M

Income Statement

Period Revenue Operating Expense Net Income Net Profit Margin Earnings Per Share EBITDA
Q1-2025 $14.049M ▲ $10.773M ▲ $-8.645M ▲ -61.535% ▼ $-0.09 ▼ $-3.815M ▲
Q4-2024 $-7.432M ▼ $-5.164M ▼ $-157.972M ▼ 2.126K% ▲ $0.43 ▲ $-143.891M ▼
Q3-2024 $14.477M ▼ $10.014M ▲ $-34.468M ▼ -238.088% ▼ $-0.35 ▼ $0 ▼
Q2-2024 $20.487M ▼ $7.879M ▼ $-9.971M ▼ -48.67% ▼ $-0.1 ▼ $3.079M ▼
Q1-2024 $28.904M $8.06M $1.442M 4.989% $0.014 $42.531M

Balance Statement

Period Cash & Short-term Total Assets Total Liabilities Total Equity
Q1-2025 $44.268M ▲ $1.235B ▼ $1.197B ▼ $37.573M ▼
Q4-2024 $34.735M ▼ $1.316B ▼ $1.271B ▲ $45.193M ▼
Q3-2024 $127.788M ▲ $1.394B ▼ $1.185B ▲ $208.182M ▼
Q2-2024 $24.807M ▲ $1.4B ▲ $1.162B ▲ $238.046M ▼
Q1-2024 $20.721M $899.625M $650.265M $249.36M

Cash Flow Statement

Period Net Income Cash From Operations Cash From Investing Cash From Financing Net Change Free Cash Flow
Q1-2025 $-8.645M ▲ $-21.126M ▲ $29.477M ▲ $0 ▲ $9.16M ▲ $-21.126M ▲
Q4-2024 $-167.367M ▼ $-48.293M ▼ $-29.334M ▼ $-602K ▲ $-79.704M ▼ $-110.041M ▼
Q3-2024 $-36.52M ▼ $-3.824M ▼ $94.424M ▲ $-641K ▲ $90.466M ▲ $26.494M ▲
Q2-2024 $1.459M $8.049M $-19.736M $-673K $-12.508M $8.049M
Q1-2024 $1.459M $8.049M $-19.736M $-673K $-12.508M $8.049M

Five-Year Company Overview

Income Statement

Income Statement The income picture over the past several years is weak and volatile. Revenue is very small and has not shown a clear growth trend. Operating results have occasionally been positive, but net income has mostly been in the red, with a noticeably larger loss in the most recent year. That pattern suggests that while the company can sometimes cover its operating costs, it has struggled to be consistently profitable after all expenses, including interest and other non‑operating items. Earnings per share swing from profit to loss and back again, which underlines how fragile and unpredictable the underlying earnings power has been.

Balance Sheet

Balance Sheet The balance sheet has been gradually shrinking, with total assets stepping down year after year. Cash on hand is modest and has not grown, staying at a low level. Debt has stayed fairly steady, which means leverage has actually risen relative to the smaller asset base. Shareholders’ equity has been eroding and is now very thin compared with the size of the balance sheet. Overall, this paints a picture of a company that has been working through a long balance‑sheet contraction, with limited cushion and little excess capital.

Cash Flow

Cash Flow Cash generation has been a consistent weak spot. Operating cash flow has been negative every year shown, and free cash flow mirrors that pattern because there is essentially no capital spending. In plain terms, the business has been consuming cash rather than producing it, year after year. That means the company has likely relied on its existing capital base and financing arrangements rather than internally generated cash to support operations and strategic moves.

Competitive Edge

Competitive Edge On the competitive side, the business has undergone a major strategic repositioning as it becomes part of Kestrel Group and moves away from traditional reinsurance. The new model focuses on acting as a specialist intermediary in the insurance value chain rather than taking large amounts of risk on its own balance sheet. Exclusive access to well‑rated carrier partners, along with a management team that knows the specialty program space, gives it some differentiation. However, the company is effectively re‑establishing itself in a crowded specialty insurance and program fronting market, so its long‑term competitive strength will depend heavily on execution and its ability to win and retain attractive program partners.

Innovation and R&D

Innovation and R&D Innovation is less about classic research spending and more about business model design and technology‑enabled execution. The new Kestrel platform is meant to be “capital‑light” and fee‑based, using data and, over time, AI‑driven tools to connect program managers and reinsurers with carrier capacity more efficiently. The company is still early in building and proving these capabilities, and many details about proprietary systems are not yet public. There is clear intent to lean on technology and process innovation, but the real impact on underwriting quality, efficiency, and margins will only become visible over the next several years.

Summary

Overall, the historical financial record shows a company that has struggled with profitability, shrinking assets, and persistent negative cash flow, leaving a thinner capital base and limited financial flexibility. At the same time, the strategic pivot into Kestrel Group represents a clean break with the past and a move toward a more modern, capital‑light, fee‑oriented specialty insurance model. The new structure, carrier partnerships, and experienced leadership create potential for a more stable and scalable earnings profile, but this remains largely unproven. From here, the key questions are whether the new model can generate steady fee income, improve cash generation, and rebuild financial strength while successfully differentiating itself in the competitive specialty insurance ecosystem.